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Abstract 
Google Play is the official market of Android apps. The app publishers make money by selling apps, through in-app billing, and 
through advertisements. The apps, especially the popular ones, are disassembled by adversaries, who then add/replace ads in the 
apps, and/or add some malicious code to the apps, and then release it to app markets. This is called app repackaging. Any 
revenue these repacked-apps make on these ads go to the adversaries. Also, if the repackaged apps have malwares then the 
malwares now spread more swiftly because of the popularity of the apps. In this paper, we present our study on some Android 
apps released to unofficial markets which were originally released to Google Play to find how prevalent the repackaging of 
Android apps is. Moreover, we proposed a mechanism for the detection of repackaging based on the permissions of the apps. To 
evaluate the performance of proposed approach, we downloaded 50 apps, each with well over a hundred million downloads from 
the official Android market, and tried to find their repackaged versions on unofficial markets based on extra permissions. We 
found repackaged versions of 6 out of these 50 apps without such a naive approach. This just goes to demonstrate how widely 
available the repackaged versions of some of the most popular Android apps are. It also proves that, in many cases, it is possible 
to detect repackaging only by comparing the permissions of an app with its original version. To a wide extent, there is no need of 
complex code analysis, or adding some authentication entity such as a watermark to the app for deterring repackaging. 
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1. Introduction 
Mostly, Android operating system is the used in today’s smartphone devices [1]. An android app can be 
distributed through any medium the developer likes. Users obtain apps from unofficial markets as well as from the 
official one. A market may have some policy regarding the quality of the apps it releases, or it may not. Android 
provides no guarantee against the harms a third-party app may cause to the user. If a market provides no guarantee 
either, which is the case with many existing markets, then the user is installing apps from the market completely at 
his/her own risk. Also, if the market does not ensure that the app is original then someone may actually steal the 
revenue deserved by the original developer. The developers, therefore, are as much affected by app repackaging as 
the users. There are many techniques which focus on detection of the malwares in Android apps. Mostly, malwares 
use repackaging for spreading [2-3] and it might be more effective to directly detect repackaging. 
There are many techniques exist which can detect repackaged apps. Most existing techniques do not take 
advantage of the fact that the majority of repackaged (trojanized) apps ask for more permissions than their original 
versions [4]. When adversaries repackage an app with different advertisements or with malicious code, they usually 
add some permissions also to the app. Detecting these extra permissions can be one of the most straightforward ways 
of detecting repackaging. In this paper, we proposed a mechanism for the detection of repackaging based on the 
permissions of the apps. To evaluate the performance of proposed approach, we downloaded 50 apps, each with well 
over a hundred million downloads from the official Android market, and tried to find their repackaged versions on 
unofficial markets based on extra permissions. We found repackaged versions of 6 out of these 50 apps without such 
a naive approach. 
The paper is composed of the following sections. Section 1 highlights how popular Android is‚ and introduces the 
Android app repackaging issue. Section 2 briefs the security aspects of Android OS, examines some Android 
malwares, and then presents some basic knowledge about Android markets. Section 3 presents literature survey. Our 
study of prevalence of app repackaging is presented in detail in section 4. Section 5 has discussions on the 
experiments. Finally section 6, concludes the paper. 
2. Android Security‚ Android malware‚ and Android markets 
The Android operating system provides security to the user through a permission-based model. When the user 
installs an app, package installer prompts the user to grant the permissions asked by the app. A user has to grant all 
the permissions, or the user may choose not installing the app. There is also a signature in every Android app but it 
does not serve any security related purpose. Further, Android protects the data of one app from another by applying 
the technique of sandboxing. Every Android app has a manifest file, AndroidManifest.xml. It holds the permissions 
needed by the app among other things. If an app needs a permission from the user, it must be listed in the manifest 
file. These are exactly the permissions which are displayed to the user at the time of installation. When repackaging 
an app, if the adversary adds permission to the app then the manifest file of the repackaged app would certainly be 
different from that of original app. 
2.1. Android Malware 
There are many Android malwares that have been known to employ repackaging to spread. If they use a popular 
app, the spread is very quick. Following are some such malwares [12-32]: 
DroidKungFu,DroidKungFuvariants,Endofday,Fakeangry,Fjcon,Geinimi,GeoFeeBot,GingerMaster,GoldDream,Hip
poSMS,Jifake,JSMSHider, Mania,Moghava,Pjapps, Plankton,Premiumtext,PushBot, YZHCSMS,Zitmo,Zsone. 
2.2. Android App Markets 
The default setting of Android is that it does not allow its users to install apps from any source other than the 
official market, Google Play. The user has to enable the "Allow installation of apps from unknown sources" option 
from the Security settings screen to be able to install apps from unofficial sources. There are many successful third-
party Android markets such as SlideME, 1Mobile Market, Amazon App Store, Mobile9, F-Droid, Samsung Galaxy 
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Apps, Opera Mobile Store, Mobango, Soc.io Mall, GoAPK, GetJar, and Mobogenie. The benefits to the developer 
and to the users differ from market to market. Some markets are more user-friendly than others. They provide 
intelligent recommendations, advanced search features, etc. Some markets are more developer-friendly than others. 
They provide higher percentage of profit to the developer, better app promotion, etc. 
3. Related Work 
Zhou et al. [2] present their study of different traits of Android malwares including the modes of propagation and 
installation used by Android malwares. They observe that the most used mode is app repackaging. Vidas et al. [3] 
observe the same thing in their study. They observe that the majority of malware families in their dataset employed 
repackaging. There are several techniques which detect app repackaging by detecting how similar the source codes 
of the app is to some existing apps [4] [5]. Wu et al. [6] and Ren et al. [7] propose detection of app repackaging 
through a watermarking-based authentication mechanism. Some existing techniques [8] [9] [10] detect app 
repackaging based on similarity in data or control dependencies in the source code of the apps. 
4. Measuring the prevalence of Android App Repackaging 
Each market has a different set of policies it follows and due to differences in policies, different kinds of apps end 
up in markets. Some existing markets have much more repackaged apps then others [3]. Google Play scans apps and 
additionally, scrutinizes apps with negative user feedbacks. Other markets follow their own specific policies. 
Whether each and every app on a market has been tested as per its policies is never a guarantee. 
We performed a very simple experiment. We downloaded 50 apps from the official Android market such that all 
of the apps have more than one hundred million downloads. After downloading these app from Google Plays‚ we 
searched the same app names on Mobogenie market (an unofficial market we randomly picked) and downloaded the 
apps with the same/similar names to obtain 50 more APKs. The resultant dataset has a total of 100 APKs. We then 
compared the permissions asked by each pair of APKs. The results and related observations are presented 
henceforth. 
4.1. Dataset Used 
The dataset consists of the APKs of the following apps downloaded from Google Play (the official Android app 
market), and Mobogenie markets: Adobe AIR(Adobe Systems); Adobe Flash Player(Adobe Systems); Adobe 
Reader(Adobe Systems); Amazon Kindle (Amazon.com); Angry Birds(Rovio Entertainment Ltd.); Angry Birds 
Rio(Rovio Entertainment Ltd.); Angry Birds Seasons(Rovio Entertainment Ltd.); AntiVirus Security – FREE(AVG 
Mobile); Avast Mobile Security & Antivirus(Avast); Barcode Scanner(ZXing Team); Blurb Checkout(Blurb Inc.); 
Candy Crush Saga(King); Clash of Clans(Supercell); Clean Master(Cheetah Mobile); Drag Racing(Creative 
Mobile);  Dropbox(Dropbox, Inc.); DU Battery Saver(DU APPS STUDIO); eBay(eBay); ES File Explorer(ES APP 
Group); Facebook(Facebook); Facebook Messenger(Facebook); Farm Heroes Saga(King); Flipboard: Your News 
Magazine(Flipboard); Fruit Ninja Free (Halfbrick Studios); Glow Hockey(NatenaiAriyatrakool); GO Launcher 
EX(GO Launcher Dev Team); Hill Climb Racing(Fingersoft); Instagram(Instagram); Jetpack Joyride(Halfbrick 
Studios); KakaoTalk: Free Calls & Text(DaumKakao); LINE: Free Calls & Messages(LINE Corporation); Minion 
Rush(Gameloft); My Talking Tom(Outfit7); MX Player(J2 Interactive); Netflix(Netflix Inc.); Opera Mini web 
browser(Opera Software ASA); PicsArt Photo Studio(PicsArt); Pool Billiards Pro(TerranDroid); Pou(Zakeh); 
Shazam(Shazam); Shoot Bubble Deluxe(City Games LLC); Snapchat(Snapchat Inc.); Subway Surfers(Kiloo 
Games); Super-Bright LED Flashlight(Surpax Technology Inc.); Tango - Free Video Call & Chat(Tango); Temple 
Run(Imangi Studios); Temple Run 2(Imangi Studios);Viber: Free Calls & Messages(Viber Media, Ltd); 
WeChat(WeChatTencent); WhatsApp Messenger(WhatsApp Inc.).All of these apps are free on Google Play and 
have more than one hundred million downloads. 
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4.2. Results 
We assume that the permissions asked by APKs from Google Play are legitimate. Their permissions are the base 
permissions against which permissions asked by APKs downloaded from other sources are compared in our 
experiment. This assumption has been further discussed in Section 5. 
When the 50 apps listed in the dataset were analyzed for any extra permissions‚ differences were found among 
the permissions asked by APKs of 6 apps downloaded from Google Play and Mobogenie. One of the two APKs of 
the same app asked for extra permissions for the same functionality − for the six apps. Not surprisingly‚ for all the 
six apps‚ the APK from Mobogenie was the one asking for extra permissions. Table 1 mentions the six apps on 
Google Play which have apps with the same name on Mobogenie market asking for extra permissions. It is highly 
likely that all these APKs from Mobogenie market either have malicious code, or have some added or replaced 
advertisements, or have modified in-app billing parameters. 
Pou is one of the six apps whose Mobogenie version asks for more permissions than its Google Play version. 
This comparison of permissions from two APKs can be automated. We used APKTool to decompress the APK files 
and obtained the manifest files (AndroidManifest.xml) from the APKs. Figure 1 shows part of the manifest file of 
Pou's APK downloaded from Google Play with all the uses-permissions tags. Figure 2 shows part of the manifest 
file of Pou's APK downloaded from Mobogenie with all the uses-permissions tags. Obviously‚ there are many more 
permissions in figure 2 than in figure 1. 
Table 1.Apps with 100‚000‚000+ downloads on Google Play which also have an APK available on Mobogenie that ask extra 
permissions. 
App (Developer) 
Permissions asked by APK of the app downloaded 
from Google Play 
Permissions asked by APK of the app 
downloaded from Mobogenie 
Glow Hockey 
(NatenaiAriyatrakool) 
VIBRATE 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
WAKE_LOCK 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
SET_ORIENTATION 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_CO
MMANDS 
GET_ACCOUNTS 
com.android.launcher.permission.RE
AD_SETTINGS 
 
Pou 
(Zakeh) 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
WAKE_LOCK 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
RECORD_AUDIO 
BLUETOOTH 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 
com.android.vending.BILLING 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
WAKE_LOCK 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
RECORD_AUDIO 
BLUETOOTH 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 
com.android.vending.BILLING 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
com.fede.launcher.permission.READ
_SETTINGS 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
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Angry Birds Seasons (Rovio 
Entertainment Ltd.) 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
WAKE_LOCK 
GET_ACCOUNTS 
com.android.vending.BILLING 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission. 
REGISTRATION 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
WAKE_LOCK 
GET_ACCOUNTS 
com.android.vending.BILLING 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.
RECEIVE 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission. 
REGISTRATION 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
com.fede.launcher.permission.READ
_SETTINGS 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW 
GET_TASKS 
Angry Birds Rio (Rovio 
Entertainment Ltd.) 
(same as that for Angry Birds Seasons) 
(same as that for Angry Birds 
Seasons) 
Super-Bright LED Flashlight 
(Surpax Technology Inc.) 
CAMERA 
FLASHLIGHT 
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
WAKE_LOCK 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
INTERNET 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
INTERNET 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
RESTART_PACKAGES 
CAMERA 
FLASHLIGHT 
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION 
WAKE_LOCK 
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.
RECEIVE 
Pool Billiards Pro 
(TerranDroid) 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE  
com.android.vending.BILLING 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
GET_TASKS 
com.android.vending.BILLING 
com.fede.launcher.permission.READ
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_SETTINGS 
Glow Hockey 
(NatenaiAriyatrakool) 
VIBRATE 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
WAKE_LOCK 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
SET_ORIENTATION 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_CO
MMANDS 
GET_ACCOUNTS 
com.android.launcher.permission.RE
AD_SETTINGS 
 
 
Fig. 1. Part of manifest file of Pou gaming app downloaded from Google Play showing permissions required by the app 
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Fig. 2. Part of manifest file of Pou gaming app downloaded from Mobogenie showing permissions required by the app 
5. Discussion 
First of all, the authenticity of the apps available on Google Play, that their permissions are legitimate, is an 
assumption in our experiment. However, this assumption is good to work with because Google takes various 
measures to protect the Android users. It removes any app which is found too similar to an existing app. Also, 
Google reviews the apps it receives complains about. Mostly, the real problem is caused by many Android app 
markets other than Google Play. 
Ideal Condition: The ideal condition for a permission-based repackaging detection effort would be that 
developers provide the original permissions needed by their apps. We claim that the developers would go the extra 
mile to provide the permissions and prevent the repackaging of their apps. The fact that the developer has monetary 
incentive if the users of his/her app do not use a repackaged version is enough to ensure that the developer would 
provide the manifest information of their apps. Let us examine the following four exhaustive scenarios. [Scenario 1] 
The app is a paid app: If the users do not install the repackaged version for their own safety that it is likely that they 
would look for the original app and would, eventually, find it. So, the real developer makes money not some app 
plagiarist. [Scenario 2] The app is a free app with advertisements inside: Again, if the users find the original app, the 
revenue from advertisements would go to the real developer. In repackaged apps, plagiarists redirect the ad revenue. 
This is the most common motivation of the plagiarists [4] [10] [11]. [Scenario 3] The app is free with in-app billing: 
Inside most apps (particularly gaming apps), users can buy virtual commodities by paying real money. This revenue 
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again can be redirected by the plagiarists. If repackaging is hampered, the real developer makes the money. 
[Scenario 4] The app is free and the developer makes no money through it: Even in this case the developer would 
not like his/her app to be repackaged because the reputation of the developer is at stake. If an app associated with a 
developer/publisher is known to have many malicious variants, it is likely that the users are going to refrain from 
using any apps released later by that developer/publisher. 
6. Conclusion  
There is no doubt that the dataset could be larger. Larger dataset supports the claim more strongly. Though, the 
experimentation on the dataset used has satisfactorily proved all the points we set out to prove. Firstly, the 
repackaging is rampant in alternative Android markets. Out of just 50 apps from Google Play, repackaged versions 
of 6 apps were found on Mobogenie market. Secondly, the higher the popularity of the app, the higher the likelihood 
that an alternative market will have a repackaged version of it. Note that apps with more than one hundred million 
downloads were included in the dataset. Thirdly, most repackaged versions ask for more permissions. Lastly, the 
most important point that in many cases it may be possible to detect repackaging only on the basis of the 
permissions of apps. 
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